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Unraveling the Veil:
The Concepts of Limited Liability and Disregard of the Corporate Entity
I. Limited Liability:
The limited liability of the corporate shareholder is a traditional cornerstone in 
American corporate law.1 It has been the prevailing rule for corporations in the United 
States for more than a century.2 Limited liability restricts the liability of a company’s 
owners for nothing more than the capital they have invested in the business.3 This is one 
of the main reasons people form corporations. An adequately formed corporation will 
normally prevent the shareholders from being personally liable for the corporation’s 
debts. The shareholders’ liability is usually limited to the amount that they have invested. 
Thus, if the corporation falls into debt after the shareholders have made their initial 
capital contribution, the shareholders are not typically responsible for those debts.4
There are many advantages of allowing limited liability in the corporate setting. 
Limited liability encourages capital formation by the pooling of assets from numerous 
investors.5 This is necessary to finance enterprises which a single investor may find too 
risky or may lack adequate capitalization. Limited liability also encourages corporate 
entities to take risks that they might otherwise avoid.6 Risk is necessary for growth, and 
investors are more likely to take risks when their personal assets are not subjected to the 
probability of the business enterprise’s success.7 Furthermore, since limited liability 
allows investors to invest with more assurance in ventures where they have no executive 
involvement, they can considerably expand their number of investments and thus attain 
2more extensive diversification in their portfolios.8 This is important for investors because 
diversification is recognized as an efficient pattern for investments.9
Scholars have heavily debated the concept of limited liability.10 While most favor 
limited liability, many scholars argue that limited liability creates an incentive for 
corporations to manipulate the law and engage in unduly risky activities.11 For instance, a 
large corporation may create many separate subsidiary corporations to minimize its 
exposure to liability. This is in fact what most large corporations do to enable insulation 
for the parent company for liability for the obligations of its various subsidiaries.12 For 
example, the Mobil Oil Corporation operates in over 60 countries through 525 
subsidiaries.13 While this is legal, many argue that a system of pro rata shareholder 
liability may be a rational approach.14 This system would hold each shareholder liable for 
damages according to their respective ownership in the corporation. However, other 
scholars have pointed out that any pro rata shareholder liability system may fail because 
it would be virtually impossible to obtain personal jurisdiction over out-of-state 
shareholders who have insufficient contacts with the forum state apart from their shares 
in the liable corporation.15 
In any event, the majority of scholars and politicians believe that any propositions 
of unlimited liability are simply impracticable. Most corporations and small businesses in 
the United States rely on limited liability in order to operate.16 Furthermore, the U.S. 
Supreme Court recently endorsed the common law rule of limited liability in U.S. v. 
Bestfoods.17 This dispels any discussion of limited liability being proved unwarranted in 
the federal courts.18 In any case, the eradication of limited liability would necessitate 
legislative action; action that any politician would most likely not want to pursue as it 
3would appear “anti-small business.”19 According to Professor David Leebron of 
Columbia University, “[n]o principle seems more established in capitalist law, or more 
essential to the functioning of the modern corporate economy” than limited liability.20 
In summary, limited liability shields the personal assets of corporate shareholders 
from the claims of corporate creditors. A shareholder’s liability is restricted to the capital 
which the shareholder has invested in the corporation.21 Since a corporation is a legal 
entity separate from its shareholders, it is solely liable for its debts.22 However, the courts 
will disregard the corporate entity and “pierce the corporate veil” when the corporation 
has been used in a fraudulent manner to deceive creditors or others dealing with them.23 
II. Piercing the Corporate Veil:
Despite the advantages of limited liability in the corporate setting, it also means 
that creditors of failed corporations are not going to be paid what the corporation may 
owe them. The likely response of the unpaid creditors is to attempt to sue the 
shareholders of the failed corporation. The unpaid creditors will argue that due to abuse 
of the corporate form by persons in control of the corporation, limited liability should not 
be upheld. The unpaid creditors will argue that the court should extend liability beyond 
the corporate entity, or, “pierce the corporate veil.”24 The veil is pierced, so to speak, if 
the court imposes liability upon the shareholders for the corporation’s debt to the 
creditor.25 This is done when a court determines that the debt in question is not really a 
debt of the corporation but in fairness should be viewed as a debt of the individual or the 
shareholder.26 This is not done without due consideration. The court’s decision depends 
on the facts of each case. Typically, the party seeking to pierce the veil must show that an 
4individual controlled or used the business so as to evade a personal obligation, perpetrate 
a fraud or a crime, gain an unfair advantage, or commit an injustice.27 
The law surrounding the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is somewhat 
complex and confusing.28 The facts of each case are important and wide variation exists 
from case to case.29 The doctrine has been given many labels including the “alter ego” 
theory, the “instrumentality” theory, and the “corporate disregard” theory.30 Moreover, 
the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is used to explain a variety of different 
problems.31 Not only does the doctrine concern when the limited liability of the corporate 
entity should be disregarded, but it is also used in situations where a corporate 
shareholder may want to pierce the veil of his own corporation and sometimes in reverse 
to allow someone to reach the assets of the corporation to satisfy a claim or judgment 
against a corporate insider or a shareholder.32 
Furthermore, there are many doctrinal offshoots such as the “enterprise liability” 
theory, holding a group of corporations under common control as one enterprise for 
liability purposes, and “equitable subordination,” holding the claims of shareholders 
subordinate in favor of outside creditors.33 However confusing and complex the doctrine 
and its offshoots may be, it is invoked quite frequently.34 In fact, according to Professor 
Robert Thompson of Washington University, “[p]iercing the corporate veil is the most 
litigated issue in corporate law…”35 Although Professor Thompson concedes later in that 
same sentence that the issue “remains among the least understood.”36 Even Judge 
Cardozo declared in Berkley v. Third Ave. Ry. Co. that the entire doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil is “enveloped in the mists of metaphor.”37 
5Piercing the corporate veil is an equitable remedy which must be examined on an 
ad hoc basis.38 The court’s analysis is highly dependent on the facts of each case.39 
Courts usually consider a variety of factors in determining whether to pierce the veil.40 
Traditionally, courts have been more likely to pierce the corporate veil when there has 
been a presence of two or more of the following factors: (1) the failure to maintain 
adequate corporate records or to comply with corporate formalities; (2) the corporation’s 
initial financing was not reasonably adequate, i.e., undercapitalization; (3) the 
commingling of funds or assets; (4) one corporation treating the assets of another 
corporation as its own; or (5) the corporation was formed to evade existing obligations or 
otherwise to cheat or defraud creditors.41 In other words, when “corporate formalities are 
substantially observed, initial financing reasonably adequate, and the corporation was not 
formed to evade an existing obligation or a statute or to cheat or to defraud, even a 
controlling shareholder enjoys limited liability.”42 Furthermore, before a court will 
disregard the corporate fiction and impose personal liability on the shareholders for the 
obligations of the corporation, there must be an abuse of the corporate form to evade the 
corporate obligation such that adherence to the concept of limited liability would sanction 
a fraud or promote an injustice.43 
According to Professor Stephen B. Presser of Northwestern University, perhaps 
the most commonly quoted general rule of piercing the corporate veil is stated by Judge 
Sanborn in United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co.44:
[A] corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule, and until 
sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but, when the notion of legal entity is 
used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, 
the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons. 
 
6Accordingly, Professor Robert Clark, the former Dean of Harvard Law School, suggests 
that the basic legal rule of piercing the corporate veil is rather straight-forward45:
The corporate veil will be pierced, and the shareholders and/or the controlling 
parties will be subjected to personal liability for the debts of the corporation, 
when the corporation has served as the instrumentality or alter ego of shareholders 
or controlling parties.  
 
Professor Clark asserts that while the basic rule is rather undemanding, the complications 
come in its application.46 Clark admits that while this basic rule may be helpful in an 
academic setting, it is not particularly useful to practitioners who need to focus more on 
the individual facts involved in each case.47 Of course, Professor Presser points out that 
the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is an ever-changing doctrine that is “never 
likely to be pinned down to rigid particulars, and that it will evolve and change as long as 
our conception of, and ours goals for, the corporation remain changing.”48 
An important thing to note before invoking the doctrine of piercing the corporate 
veil is that a plaintiff must first establish an independent basis to hold the corporation 
liable.49 The plaintiff must prove that the corporation is liable for a tort or breach of 
contract.50 If the corporation has insufficient assets to cover the judgment, the plaintiff 
may then attempt to disregard the corporate entity and pierce through the veil that 
protects the shareholders from liability.51 This is important because without an 
independent basis to hold the corporation liable, the issue of piercing the corporate veil 
will never emerge.  
Furthermore, it is important to consider what the substance of the claim is. 
According to a study of over 1600 veil piercing cases by Professor Robert Thompson, 
courts upheld piercing the corporate veil in about 40% of contract cases and in about 30% 
of tort cases.52 This goes to show that not only have courts “been reluctant to pierce the 
7corporate veil,”53 but the success of any suit is correlated to the underlying substance of 
the claim.54 While some commentators suggest that courts are more willing to pierce the 
corporate veil and extend liability to shareholders when a tort has been committed,55 
Professor Thompson’s study shows us that this is not always necessarily true.56 
Thompson argues that the most troublesome problems in the area of veil piercing are 
fraudulent transactions and misrepresentation.57 While Thompson does concur that courts 
will frequently pierce the corporate veil for undercapitalization of the corporate entity in 
tort, he explains that these represent only a small portion of veil-piercing cases.58 In 
summary, Thompson argues that contract claims are more frequent than tort claims, and 
while courts may in certain circumstances be more willing to pierce the corporate veil 
when a tort has been committed, every claim depends on the specific facts.59 
III. Factors to Consider in Piercing the Corporate Veil:
Many courts vary in their willingness to pierce the corporate veil.60 Even in courts 
that are willing to do so, this is considered an extreme remedy.61 Courts have usually 
been reluctant to pierce the corporate veil when three elements are satisfied: (i) corporate 
formalities are substantially observed; (ii) the corporation’s initial financing was 
reasonably adequate; and (iii) the corporation was not formed to evade existing 
obligations or otherwise defraud creditors.62 However, there are no definite rules to 
determine when the corporate veil will be pierced.63 Courts must instead contemplate a 
number of factors in determining whether to pierce the veil. There is no definitive list of 
factors which a court will consider. As a general rule, courts usually require at least two 
factors be present before the corporate veil will be pierced.64 Additionally, many courts 
require that an element of injustice or fundamental unfairness be present before they will 
8pierce the corporate veil.65 According to many scholars and courts, the most common 
grouping is usually inadequate capitalization along with failure to follow corporate 
formalities.66 Discussed below are the most prominent factors a court will consider.  
a. Inadequate Capitalization:
Perhaps the single most important factor which most courts consider in whether to 
pierce the corporate veil is whether the corporation has been inadequately capitalized.67 
The incorporators and directors of a corporation have an obligation to provide adequate 
capitalization upon incorporation.68 Inadequate capitalization is measured at the time of 
formation and is a continuing obligation from then on during the corporation’s 
operations.69 Inadequate capitalization or “undercapitalization” has been identified as a 
ground to pierce the corporate veil “[i]f the capital be trifling or illusory compared with 
the business to be done or the risks of loss, this is a ground for denying the separate entity 
privilege.”70 This places a requirement on incorporators and directors to fund the 
corporation with an adequate amount of capital upon incorporation for a transitional 
period of time.71 However, it is important to keep in mind that corporate liability must be 
determined before any question relating to shareholder liability from inadequate 
capitalization will be considered.72 
Professor Presser has determined that the basic concept behind theory of 
inadequate capitalization “is that if the shareholder or shareholders deliberately 
incorporate with initial capital they know to be inadequate to meet the expected liabilities 
of the business they intend to be doing, they are engaging in an abuse of the corporate 
form, and ought to be individually liable when those liabilities actually occur.”73 Thus, 
incorporators and directors must consider many factors in determining how much capital 
9should be placed in the corporation upon incorporation. They must consider things such 
as what type of corporation they are creating, how long the transitional period of time 
will be until the corporation should become profitable, and how much funding the 
corporation will require to be considered adequate.74 
Since a corporation must be initially adequately capitalized to avoid veil piercing, 
it is important to consider what “capital” actually is for these purposes. Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines “capital” as “money or assets invested, or available for investments, in 
a business.”75 Capital has also been defined as equity which is permanently contributed to 
the corporation and subject to control by the corporation’s board of directors.76 Other 
scholars consider capital to include everything a corporation owns which is available to 
satisfy their liabilities.77 Moreover, some courts have held that liability insurance 
coverage, purchased by corporations to cover possible liabilities, may be considered to be 
the capital of the business.78 Therefore, it is important to remember that not only the 
initial money and/or assets invested into a corporation may be considered “capital,” but a 
court must also consider other contributions such as liability insurance coverage, loans, 
and other equity which a corporation may attain.79 
Furthermore, it is important to consider when capital will be deemed adequate. 
According to Professors Pinto and Branson,80 there is very little authority on what 
constitutes inadequate capitalization.81 Most courts usually cite to Professor Ballantine’s 
well-known “trifling or illusory” epigram in comparing the capital to the type of 
corporation involved.82 If the amount of capital is “trifling or illusory” in comparison 
with the type of corporation involved, it is usually ruled to be inadequate. According to 
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Pinto and Branson, courts apply a “know it when they see it” standard, or let the jury 
decide whether the capital was adequate.83 
A common issue of debate is whether inadequacy of capital alone is a sufficient 
ground to pierce the corporate veil. Some scholars point out that older statutes placed a 
requirement upon corporations to provide a certain amount of capital actually paid in 
prior to commencing business.84 However, current corporate statutes allow persons to 
incorporate with minimum capital or without capital at all. Thus, once the corporation’s 
articles of incorporation have been accepted by the Secretary of the State, the corporation 
is provided with limited liability, regardless of whether any capital has been paid in.85 
Therefore, some scholars argue that courts should not be able to circumvent the desires of 
the legislature and disregard limited liability by requiring some form of minimum capital 
if the corporate statutes do not require it.86 The courts are split on this issue.  
The minority view holds that the corporate veil may be pierced if there has been 
grossly inadequate capitalization of a corporation.87 The best-known case representing 
this view is Minton v. Cavaney.88 In Minton, a young girl drowned in a swimming pool 
owned by the Seminole Hot Springs Corporation (Seminole). The Mintons, the young 
girl’s parents, sued Seminole and received a judgment against them which remained 
unsatisfied. The Mintons then sought to pierce the corporate veil and hold Cavaney, the 
director, secretary, treasurer, and majority owner of Seminole stock, personally liable for 
the judgment against Seminole. Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court 
identified three alternative grounds for piercing the corporate veil holding that “[t]he 
equitable owners of a corporation…are personally liable when they treat the assets of the 
corporation as their own and add or withdraw capital from the corporation at will; when 
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they hold themselves out as being personally liable for the debts of the corporation; or 
when they provide inadequate capitalization and actively participate in the conduct of 
corporate affairs.”89 However, the Court only focused on the issue of undercapitalization 
in this case. The Court found that there “was no attempt to provide adequate 
capitalization” in this case since “Seminole never had any substantial assets,” they 
“leased the pool that [they] operated,” and they “forfeited [the lease] for failure to pay the 
rent.”90 The Court held that this was reason enough to pierce the corporate veil and hold 
Cavaney liable for the judgment against Seminole. However, it should be noted that this 
is one of the very few sources of authority for this point of view and that “inadequate 
capitalization per se [may no longer] trigger veil piercing in California.”91 
Nevertheless, most courts and scholars agree that undercapitalization alone should 
not be enough to trigger veil piercing.92 While the Minton case and some dicta from other 
cases seem to maintain the idea that grossly inadequate capitalization alone will support 
veil piercing, the consensus from the majority of scholars is that you need 
undercapitalization plus some other factor/s present to pierce the veil.93 Typically, most 
courts require that there be either some affirmative fraud or wrongdoing by the 
shareholder, or failure to follow the formalities of corporate existence before the 
corporate veil will be pierced.94 According to Professor Berle, the typical case of piercing 
the veil for undercapitalization occurs where a “central corporation owns a controlling 
interest in one or more other corporations, but has so handled them that they have ceased 
to represent a separate enterprise and have become, as a business matter, more or less 
indistinguishable parts of a larger enterprise.”95 Berle proposes that the typical case 
involves undercapitalization plus another factor, which is most commonly the 
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intermingling of business affairs.96 Berle suggests that undercapitalization alone is 
insufficient to pierce the corporate veil and something more is needed.97 
Perhaps the most well-known case representing the majority view that grossly 
inadequate capitalization is only a factor in determining whether to pierce the corporate 
veil is Walkovszky v. Carlton.98 In Walkovszky, John Walkovszky was injured when he 
was hit by a cab owned by the Seon Cab Corporation (Seon). Seon was owned by 
William Carlton, who also owned ten other cab corporations. Seon and the ten other cab 
corporations each had only two cabs registered in their name and the cabs carried only 
the minimum liability insurance required by law of $10,000. Walkovszky alleged that the 
corporations “operated as a single entity…with regard to financing, supplies, repairs, 
employees, and garaging.” Walkovszky thus sought to hold Carlton personally liable for 
his injuries “because the multiple corporate structure constitute[d] an unlawful attempt to 
defraud members of the general public who might be injured by the cabs.” The court 
acknowledged the fact that the “corporations were intentionally undercapitalized for the 
purpose of avoiding responsibility for acts which were bound to arise as a result of the 
operation of a large taxi fleet having cars out on the street 24 hours a day and engaged in 
public transportation.”99 However, the court held that this was the very purpose of 
allowing limited liability for those engaged in this type of business. The court held that 
the corporate entity may not be disregarded simply because of the fact that “the assets of 
the corporation, together with the mandatory insurance coverage of the vehicle…are 
insufficient to assure [Walkovszky] the recovery [he] sought.”100 The court further held 
that it is up to the legislature to determine the amount of minimum liability insurance 
required by law. Thus, unless Walkovszky could show that Carlton conducted the 
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business in his individual capacity or used some type of fraud, the court found that 
Walkovszky could not recover. It is worth mentioning, however, that Walkovszky 
eventually won his case when he filed an amended complaint alleging that not only were 
the corporations undercapitalized, but Carlton intentionally undercapitalized the 
corporations in the way they were organized and insured, and by siphoning profits from 
the companies.101 
Another key case supporting the view that undercapitalization alone is not enough 
to pierce the corporate veil is Fletcher v. Atex, Inc.102 In Fletcher, Marianne Fletcher sued 
Atex, Inc. (Atex) and its parent corporation, Eastman Kodak Company (Kodak), for 
damages from repetitive stress injuries due to the faulty design of computer keyboards 
manufactured by Atex. Fletcher sought to pierce the corporate veil and hold Kodak liable 
alleging Atex was intentionally left undercapitalized due to Kodak’s centralized cash 
management system. Through this system Atex maintained zero balance bank accounts 
and funds were only transferred from Kodak when Atex was in need. The court held that 
“without considerably more,” the use of a centralized cash management system was not 
enough to pierce the corporate veil.103 Thus, Fletcher was unable to pierce the corporate 
veil solely for reasons of undercapitalization.  
Scholars Pinto and Branson104 believe that Fletcher does damage to the veil 
piercing doctrine by encouraging parent corporations to purposely leave their subsidiaries 
undercapitalized and thus deprive them “of any financial independence.”105 Pinto and 
Branson suggest that any centralized cash management system will encourage fraudulent 
bookkeeping by allowing excessive cash flow to be “upstreamed” to the parent 
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corporation while the subsidiary retains the liabilities.106 At any rate, most courts agree 
that the practice is completely acceptable.107 
It is important to note that courts are especially likely to pierce the corporate veil 
when the incorporator has invested no capital whatsoever in the corporation.108 In these 
cases a court will usually require less evidence of other factors than if the capitalization 
was merely inadequate.109 The best example of this comes from the well-known Kinney 
Shoe Corp. v. Polan case.110 In Kinney Shoe Corp., Kinney Shoe Corp. (Kinney) leased a 
building to Industrial Realty Co. (Industrial), a corporation owned by Lincoln Polan 
(Polan). Industrial had no assets, no income, no bank account, and Polan was the sole 
shareholder and officer. Polan had Industrial sub-lease the building to another of his 
corporations, Polan Industries, Inc. who refused to make any sub-lease payments to 
Industrial. Industrial, consequently, made no lease payments to Kinney. Kinney sought to 
pierce the corporate veil and hold Polan liable for the lease to Industrial. The court agreed 
with Kinney holding that Industrial was “no more than a shell.” The court further held 
that “[w]hen nothing is invested in the corporation, the corporation provides no 
protection to its owner; nothing in, nothing out, no protection.”111 
Another issue of debate is whether shareholders or a parent corporation must add 
new capital as a business grows. For instance, suppose the initial capital contributed at 
formation is adequate, but the business grows to the point where the initial contribution is 
no longer adequate to meet the new responsibilities of the company. Many scholars argue 
that this should be considered inadequate capitalization making veil-piercing more 
probable. However, others argue that they must be protected as long as the capital 
contributed at formation was more than “trifling or illusory.”112 An example of this 
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comes from the case of Arnold v. Phillips.113 In Arnold, A. M. Arnold founded the 
Southern Brewing Company (Southern), a beer brewing business, with $125,000 in initial 
capital. Southern had a two year period of success, followed by a sharp decline which 
required Arnold to make additional loans to Southern. The court held that the additional 
funds provided to Southern did not render the initial capital contribution inadequate 
because the “nature and purpose” of the business had not changed. The court further held 
that this was not a case “where the corporate entity ought to be disregarded as being a 
sham, a mere obstacle to justice, or an instrument of fraud.”114 However, the court 
mentions that if a corporation were to change its “nature and purpose,” the adequacy of 
the additional capital would have to be considered in that light.115 In these types of cases 
a plaintiff may have a better chance of veil-piercing if the corporation’s success is 
dwindling rather than succeeding. After all, an argument that a stockholder’s failure to 
replenish the capital of a failing corporation is very similar to that of inadequate initial 
capitalization. However, few courts would probably accept this argument. According to 
Professor Clark, “there is no affirmative duty on [shareholders’] part to supply an 
additional investment to a dying corporation. Such a duty would be in fundamental 
contradiction to the policy of permitting limited liability.”116 
b. Lack of Corporate Formalities:
Lack of corporate formalities is another important factor a court will consider in 
determining whether or not they will pierce the corporate veil.117 If a corporation has 
failed to follow corporate formalities in the running of the business, a court is more likely 
to pierce the veil.118 The failure to follow corporate formalities can be achieved in a 
number of ways. For instance, a corporation has failed to follow corporate formalities 
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when shareholders’ meetings and directors’ meetings are not held; corporate financial 
records are not kept; shares of the corporation are never officially issued, or consideration 
for them is never received by the corporation; and when shareholders do not distinguish 
between personal property and corporate property.119 Courts usually determine that a lack 
of corporate formalities indicates an impermissible intermixture of affairs or the use of a 
corporation as a “mere instrumentality.”120 Furthermore, when corporate formalities are 
ignored, courts usually require at least one other independent factor for piercing the 
corporate veil.121 
An example of a case where a court pierced the corporate veil for failure to follow 
corporate formalities can be found in House of Koscot Development Corp. v. American 
Line Cosmetics, Inc.122 In House of Koscot Development Corp., House of Koscot 
Development Corp. (Development) and American Line entered into an agreement for 
Development to sell retail cosmetic store franchises for American Line. Glenn Turner 
was a director and majority shareholder of American Line. American Line subsequently 
breached their contract with Development at the request of Turner. Development sought 
to pierce the corporate veil and hold Turner personally liable for the breach of contract. 
Development relied primarily on the theory that American Line was an instrumentality 
for the business activities of Turner. Development produced a substantial amount of 
evidence that Turner failed to follow normal corporate formalities by personally hiring 
and firing American Line employees, making corporate decisions without consulting 
officers or other directors, and converting corporate funds for Turner’s personal use.123 
Development also produced considerable evidence of inadequate capitalization on the 
part of Turner. The court, considering these factors of failure to follow corporate 
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formalities and inadequate capitalization, ruled in favor of Development holding that 
“[w]henever one uses control of a corporation to further his own, rather than the 
corporation's business, he will be liable for the corporation's acts under the doctrine of 
agency or under the principle of identity.”124 
Another example where the court pierced the corporate veil for failure to follow 
corporate formalities can be found in the frequently cited case of DeWitt Truck Brokers, 
Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co.125 In DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., DeWitt Truck 
Brokers, Inc. (DeWitt) furnished transportation to W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co. (Fruit 
Co.), a corporate fruit jobber.126 Fruit Co. became unable to pay DeWitt and DeWitt 
sought to pierce the corporate veil and impose liability on Flemming, the president of 
Fruit Co., personally. DeWitt provided evidence that Flemming was completely dominant 
over Fruit Co.’s affairs, that there were no corporate records of directors’ or stockholders’ 
meetings, that Flemming had issued 5,000 shares of Fruit Co. stock for consideration of 
one dollar each, that no director or officer had ever been paid by Fruit Co., and that there 
probably were no other active officers or directors.127 The court found that “corporate 
formalities, even rudimentary formalities, were not observed by [Flemming],” and that 
the corporation was operated in a “purely personal matter.”128 The court also found that 
Flemming had undercapitalized Fruit Co. and thus allowed DeWitt to pierce the veil and 
hold Flemming liable.  
An issue of debate is whether lack of corporate formalities alone is enough to 
constitute piercing the corporate veil. Most courts and scholars have held that it is not and 
will require the presence of another factor/s before the veil will be pierced.129 The Model 
Business Corporation Act is in accordance with this viewpoint that the failure to follow 
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corporate formalities, standing alone, is not a ground for piercing the corporate veil.130 
The relevant provision provides that: 
The failure of a statutory close corporation to observe the usual corporate 
formalities or requirements relating to the exercise of its corporate powers or 
management of its business and affairs is not a ground for imposing personal 
liability on the shareholders for the liabilities of the corporation.131 
The court in Tannahill v. Aunspach considered this issue.132 In Tannahill, Paul 
Aunspach, the president and a shareholder of American Delivery Services Corporation 
(American), leased cars from Rent-A-Dent for American’s delivery business. American 
later sold all their assets and defaulted on the leased cars from Rent-A-Dent. Rent-A-Dent 
sought to pierce the corporate veil and hold Aunspach liable for the money American 
owed on the leased cars. Rent-A-Dent claimed there was an “absence of corporate 
references in any of the documents exchanged in the Rent-A-Dent transaction” and thus 
the corporate entity should be disregarded for failure to follow corporate formalities. The 
court acknowledged that “[a] corporation's failure to follow corporate formalities is 
among the factors considered in making [a] determination” to pierce the corporate veil. 
However, the court held that “[t]his is not a situation in which we believe the corporate 
entity should be disregarded” because “[f]ailure to follow corporate formalities in the 
ordinary course of business does not necessarily justify piercing the corporate veil.” The 
court indicated that something more was needed to pierce the corporate veil, not just 
“failure to follow corporate formalities” alone.  
 Another case which held that lack of corporate formalities alone is not enough to 
constitute veil-piercing is Scott Graphics, Inc. v. Mahaney.133 In Scott Graphics, Inc.,
Scott Graphics, Inc. (Scott) obtained a judgment against Copy Machines, Inc. (CMI) 
which CMI never satisfied. Scott subsequently sought to pierce the corporate veil and 
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hold Mahaney, an officer, director, and shareholder of CMI, personally liable for the 
debt. Scott provided evidence of substantial disregard of corporate formalities on the part 
of Mahaney. The court agreed that there “was disregard of corporate formality in the 
operation of” CMI, however, lack of corporate formalities alone is “not enough to 
warrant disregarding the corporate entity.”134 
The main rationale for courts in considering the lack of corporate formalities in 
determining whether to pierce the veil is that the failure to follow formalities may cause 
injury to corporate creditors.135 For example, if a shareholder fails to follow corporate 
formalities by removing cash from the corporation to use for his own personal debts, he is 
causing injury to the creditor by removing money which the creditor may have 
recovered.136 Furthermore, the failure to follow corporate formalities may also injure the 
creditor by misleading him. For example, a creditor may be mislead by a shareholder who 
uses his personal name on business cards instead of the corporate name, and who may 
pay corporate bills with personal checks, etc.137 This causes injury to the creditor because 
he may now believe that he was dealing personally with the shareholder and not the 
corporation. In these situations it may be easier for the creditor to prove an element of 
injustice or fundamental unfairness, and that the shareholder should be personally liable 
for the injury.138 
However, some scholars and courts claim that it is somewhat irrational to point to 
lack of corporate formalities as a reason to pierce the corporate veil since in most of the 
cases the failure to follow formalities did not injure the creditors.139 For example, if the 
lack of corporate formalities is in the form of failure to hold shareholders’ and directors’ 
meetings, this will almost never directly injure the creditor.140 For this reason, some 
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courts hold that failure to follow corporate formalities is no longer a factor to consider in 
determining whether to pierce the corporate veil.141 Consider the case of Scott v. 
McKay.142 In Scott, John McKay was the president and general manager of Willow Creek 
Entertainment, Inc. (Willow). Willow owned a number of radio stations and was 
experiencing financial difficulties. At the request of McKay, Lynwood Scott loaned 
$100,000 to Willow. Willow then defaulted on the loan and sold all of their assets. Scott 
sought to pierce the corporate veil and hold McKay liable for the loan. The only evidence 
Scott could present was lack of corporate formalities on the part of Willow. The court 
refused to pierce the veil holding that “failure to comply with corporate formalities is no 
longer a factor in considering whether alter ego exists.”143 
In any case, the majority of scholars and courts agree that “the shareholder should 
not be permitted first to ignore the rules of corporate behavior and then later to claim the 
advantage of the corporate shield.”144 It seems that failure to follow corporate formalities 
is a persuasive factor in considering whether to pierce the corporate veil in a majority of 
jurisdictions in the United States. The court in Kinney Shoe Corp. sums it up best when it 
held that “[i]f a shareholder wishes the protection of a corporation to limit his liability, 
then he must follow the simple formalities of maintaining the corporation.”145 
c. Intermixture of Affairs:
According to Pinto and Branson,146 the term “intermixture of affairs” or 
“intertwined operations” refers to “the blurring of the distinction between the concerns of 
the corporation and those of the owners.”147 When the affairs of the corporation and those 
of the owner/s become intertwined, it becomes difficult for an outside party to determine 
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where the owner’s affairs end and where the corporation’s affairs start.148 This factor is 
closely related to and often overlaps with “lack of corporate formalities.”  
An example of when the business affairs of two corporations are intermixed, and 
separate corporate formalities are not followed, would occur if both corporations have 
exactly the same board of directors, have the same directors’ meetings, and have the same 
set of minutes for their meetings.149 Evidence of any intermixture of affairs makes veil-
piercing more likely. When the business operations of the owner and the corporation are 
completely intertwined, a court will usually apply the “instrumentality theory” to extend 
liability to the owners.150 
The court in American Trading and Production Corp. v. Fischback & Moore 
considered whether to pierce the corporate veil through the instrumentality theory for 
intermixture of affairs.151 In American Trading and Production Corp., American Trading 
and Production Corp. (American) suffered losses when a fire destroyed the exposition 
hall housing their property. The fire was caused by the faulty wiring installed by a 
subsidiary of Fischback & Moore (Fischback). Fischback owned more than twenty 
subsidiaries which wired buildings for electricity. American sought to pierce the 
corporate veil and hold Fischback liable for the shoddy work done by their subsidiary. 
American invoked an instrumentality theory alleging that Fischback dominated and 
controlled their subsidiary through their intermixture of business affairs. The court 
refused to hold Fischback accountable holding that “[t]he corporate entity is only ignored 
when the ends of justice require it.”152 The court considered the evidence of the 
business’s intertwined operations and held that it was not sufficient to invoke liability 
under a theory of instrumentality.153 
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An example of a court which did pierce the corporate veil for intermixture of 
affairs can be found in Kramer v. Keys.154 In Kramer, Jerry Kramer was killed when his 
vehicle was struck by a tractor-trailer driven by J.T. Keys, an employee of Ralph Walker, 
Inc. (RWI). Kramer’s wife brought suit against Keys and RWI, and sought to pierce the 
corporate veil to hold Ralph Walker, owner of RWI, personally liable. Mrs. Kramer 
alleged that Walker had intermingled his business affairs with RWI to such an extent that 
the corporate entity was indistinguishable. The court found sufficient justification to 
pierce the corporate veil finding evidence that Walker had included his personal assets 
among those that were depreciated on the corporation’s tax return, Walker had executed 
leases for RWI and filed other RWI reports in his own name, and had endorsed RWI 
checks by signing his own name.155 In establishing liability for Walker the court held that 
“courts will ignore separate corporate entities in order to defeat a fraud, wrong, or 
injustice, at least where the rights of third persons are concerned.”156 
Scholars point out that when business affairs are intertwined between the 
corporation and the owners, an inference is usually made that the owners are more 
accountable for the obligation.157 In order to avoid this assumption, the shareholder/s 
must preclude from intertwining their business affairs, and clearly document their 
dealings with their corporation.158 This must especially be done in “one-man 
corporations” where the corporation is owned by a single person who is the sole 
shareholder, director, etc.159 Lack of corporate formalities and intermixture of affairs 
have proven to be “unique hazards” for one-man corporations because they are inherently 
characteristic of one-man corporations.160 For example, there is no need to have one-man 
shareholders’ and directors’ meetings, the sole shareholder will more than likely invest 
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his personal funds to keep the corporation capitalized, the sole shareholder will also often 
intermingle his funds with that of the corporation’s funds, and one-man corporations are 
almost always controlled exclusively by the sole shareholder.161 These are seemingly 
necessities in running a one-man corporation but will still be considered factors in 
determining whether to pierce the corporate veil.162 That is why it is of key importance 
that the sole shareholder keeps scrupulous records in his dealings with his corporation. 
Failure to do so may give the court more reason to pierce the corporate veil.  
In any case, when the owners of a corporation treat its assets as their own, and the 
affairs of the corporation are intermixed with the owner’s affairs, the separate corporate 
entity can no longer be observed and a court must pierce the corporate veil.163 This is 
necessary to protect the corporation’s creditors.164 According to Professors Cox and 
Hazen,165 “[i]f the shareholders themselves disregard the separateness of the corporation, 
the courts also will disregard it so far as necessary to protect individual and corporate 
creditors.”166 
d. Fraud / Wrongdoing / Misrepresentation:
Another factor that courts consider in determining whether to pierce the corporate 
veil is whether there has been a serious fraud or wrongdoing by the corporation’s 
shareholder/s.167 Courts have defined “fraud” as “a misrepresentation or a suppression of 
the truth with the intention either to obtain an unjust advantage for one party or to cause a 
loss or inconvenience to the other.”168 Similarly, “wrongdoing” has been defined as 
“using the corporation as a device or sham to accomplish some ulterior purpose such as 
fraud or some illegal purpose.”169 When a corporation has been formed for the sole 
purpose of perpetrating a fraud or wrongdoing, a court may disregard the corporate 
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entity.170 Courts usually focus on whether the corporation had any other reason to exist 
other than to perpetrate a fraud or wrongdoing.171 In other words, a court will ask whether 
the only purpose of creating the corporation was to carry out a fraud. An example of a 
fraud or wrongdoing would occur if a shareholder was siphoning profits from the 
corporation thus leaving the corporation unable to pay their creditors (this is considered 
by some courts to be a form of inadequate capitalization), or if a corporation was formed 
to evade existing obligations such as a contract or a statute.172 It is important to note that 
while many scholars consider undercapitalization to be the most important factor to 
consider in piercing the corporate veil,173 courts will most often pierce the corporate veil 
in cases where fraud / misrepresentation is present.174 
When a corporation is created for the sole purpose of perpetrating a fraud, the 
court will usually pierce the corporate veil.175 This is exemplified in the case of Linn & 
Lane Timber Co. v. United States.176 In Linn & Lane Timber Co., the United States 
brought suit against Smith to recover lands conveyed to him under the Timber and Stone 
Act of 1878. The United States claimed that Smith obtained the lands from the United 
States in a fraudulent manner. Smith subsequently created a corporation to which he 
conveyed the property until the statute of limitations had run. After the statute of 
limitations had run, Smith re-conveyed the lands back to himself. The court held “that the 
corporation was the mere tool of Smith [in] an effort to keep the title concealed until it 
was too late for the United States to complain.”177 The court then awarded the lands to 
the United States holding that “the difference in legal personality between Smith and the 
corporation [gave] the corporation no greater rights than Smith” due to his fraudulent use 
of the corporate form.178 
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When a shareholder sets up a corporation with adequate initial capital, but then 
siphons out all of the profits and/or capital while the company operates, the court will 
consider this to be fraud or wrongdoing.179 This leaves the corporation with too little cash 
to satisfy corporate creditors, thus giving courts more reason to pierce the corporate veil. 
This is what happened in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source.180 In Sea-Land 
Services, Inc., Sea-Land Services, Inc. (Sea-Land), an ocean carrier, shipped freight on 
behalf of Pepper Source (Pepper). Pepper subsequently failed to pay Sea-Land for the 
freight bill. Sea-Land sued Pepper and obtained a default judgment. However, Sea-Land 
was unable to collect its judgment because Pepper had dissolved and had no assets. Sea-
Land then sought to pierce the corporate veil and hold Gerald Marchese, the sole owner 
of Pepper, liable for the judgment. After the court considered evidence that Marchese 
failed to follow corporate formalities, it focused on fraud and wrongdoing. The court 
found that Marchese had siphoned funds from Pepper, leaving Pepper unable to pay Sea-
Land, by withdrawing a salary from Pepper and frequently taking “shareholder loans” 
from Pepper to pay personal expenses.181 The court concluded that Marchese deliberately 
manipulated the assets of Pepper to ensure that Sea-Land would not be paid. The court 
further held that the corporate veil should be pierced in order to prevent “a fraud or 
promote injustice.”182 
Another example of fraud or wrongdoing can be found when a corporation is 
formed to evade existing obligations such as a contract or a statute.183 This was the case 
in Sundaco, Inc. v. State.184 In Sundaco, Inc., the State of Texas had a law mandating that 
businesses close on alternative weekends. In order to circumvent this law, the owners of 
Sundaco, Inc. (Sundaco) formed another corporation named Clark’s. Clark’s would buy 
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all of Sundaco’s goods, wares, and merchandise every other week in order to stay open 
every day of every weekend. The City of Abilene, Texas (Texas) brought suit claiming a 
violation of the statute. Texas alleged that Sundaco was the alter ego of Clark’s and was 
created for the purpose of achieving weekend sales. The court held that sale and resale 
transaction was a ploy created to evade the statute prohibiting a store from selling items 
on consecutive Saturdays and Sundays.185 The court thus allowed Texas to disregard the 
separate identity of Clark’s in bringing suit against Sundaco.  
An issue of debate is whether fraud is a necessary element that is required before 
a court will pierce the corporate veil.186 This varies somewhat from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, but the overall consensus is that it is probably not necessary, as long as there 
is some sort of injustice present.187 The court in DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. held that 
“[c]ontrary to the basic contention of the defendant…proof of fraud is not a necessary 
element in a finding to disregard the corporate entity.”188 The court in Trs. of the Nat'l 
Elevator Indus. Pension…v. Lutyk, elaborated on this view in holding that actual fraud 
was not required “as a prerequisite for piercing the corporate veil. However, where the 
conduct alleged to justify piercing the corporate veil is that the corporation as a whole is a 
“sham” or “façade,” a finding akin to fraud is necessary.”189 This view that fraud is not a 
necessary element to pierce the corporate veil, except in situations where the corporation 
is alleged to be a sham, façade, or the alter ego of the defendant, is probably the most 
common position taken amongst the courts.190 Most courts only consider fraud to be a 
factor in the overall determination of whether to pierce the corporate veil.191 According to 
Cox and Hazen, fraud is not necessarily required to pierce the corporate veil as long as 
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“[t]he facts presented…demonstrate some misuse of the corporate privilege or establish a 
need to limit it in order to do justice.”192 
e. The Instrumentality Doctrine193:
When a court finds that an individual treats a corporation “as an instrumentality 
through which he conduct[s] personal business,” the corporate entity will be disregarded 
and liability will be extended to the owner.194 A corporation is found to be a “mere 
instrumentality” of the shareholder/s when a court finds that it has no independent reason 
for its existence but to carry out the owner’s agenda.195 The instrumentality doctrine 
requires proof of three elements: (1) “control, not mere majority or complete stock 
control, but complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and business practice 
in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had 
at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own;” (2) the “control must have 
been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a 
statutory or other positive legal duty, or a dishonest or unjust act in contravention of 
plaintiff's legal rights;” and (3) the “control and breach of duty must proximately cause 
the injury or unjust loss” of the plaintiff.196 
Of course, all corporations are used in some way as business instrumentalities.197 
The scope of the question here must be whether the harm done by the owner’s “control 
and domination” would make separation of the owner and corporation inequitable.198 
According to Pinto and Branson, “[t]here must be such domination of finances, policies 
and practices that the controlled corporation has, so to speak, no separate mind, will or 
existence of its own and is but a business conduit for its principal.”199 Instrumentality 
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theories are most commonly used in the case of a parent corporation’s liability for the 
torts and contracts of its subsidiaries.200 
Perhaps the leading case extending liability to the owner of a corporation for his 
use of the entity as a “mere instrumentality” is Zaist v. Olson.201 In Zaist, Martin Olson 
was the owner of a number of corporations involved in real estate development. John 
Zaist and others (Zaist) supplied services and materials to East Haven Homes, Inc. (East 
Haven), one of Olson’s corporations. Proof was established that Olson freely used the 
services and materials provided to East Haven with his other corporations in the 
construction of a shopping center. East Haven subsequently became defunct and could 
not compensate Zaist for the unpaid balance of $21,100. Zaist sought to pierce the 
corporate veil and hold Olson personally liable for the debt, claiming that East Haven 
was an instrumentality of Olson. The court held that Olson, and another corporation 
under his control, so completely controlled East Haven that it had “no separate mind, will 
or existence of its own.”202 The court extended liability to Olson holding that when a 
“corporation is so manipulated by an individual or another corporate entity as to become 
a mere puppet or tool for the manipulator, justice may require the courts to disregard the 
corporate fiction and impose liability on the real actor.”203 
Another prominent case extending liability under the instrumentality theory is 
OTR Associates v. IBC Services, Inc.204 In OTR Associates, IBC Services, Inc. (IBC), a 
subsidiary of Blimpie International, Inc. (Blimpie), rented a space in a shopping mall 
owned by OTR Associates (OTR). IBC was created for the sole purpose of holding the 
lease and had no assets, employees, or business premises of its own.205 Samyrna, Inc. 
(Samyrna) subsequently entered into an agreement with Blimpie to sublease the space 
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from IBC as a Blimpie franchisee. Samyrna defaulted on the rent to IBC, who in turn, 
defaulted on the rent to OTR. OTR then sought to pierce the corporate veil and hold 
Blimpie responsible for the unpaid rent. OTR argued that IBC was the mere 
instrumentality of Blimpie through Blimpie’s “[d]omination and control” of “IBC to 
commit a fraud or injustice” by avoiding to compensate OTR for the unpaid rent.206 The 
court agreed that IBC was a mere instrumentality of Blimpie holding that when “the 
parent so dominate[s] the subsidiary that it ha[s] no separate existence,” liability may be 
extended to the parent corporation.207 
Cases extending liability under the instrumentality doctrine almost always contain 
one or more of the main factors of consideration for veil piercing discussed earlier.208 
Determining that a corporation is nothing but a “mere instrumentality,” acting with “no 
separate mind, will or existence of its own,” is somewhat of a conclusory finding.209 It is 
not especially useful for purposes of deciding whether the corporate veil should be 
pierced. Instead, it is “used as a matter of emphasis or posturing by litigants and courts,” 
rather than as an independent basis for piercing the corporate veil.210 Nonetheless, courts 
do consider “mere instrumentality” as an independent factor to consider in determining 
whether to pierce the corporate veil.211 
IV. Conclusion:
Clearly the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is a “befuddled” area of law. 
The lack of any definite rules and the heavy reliance on the specific facts of each case 
make it difficult to generalize as to the factors that will lead a court to disregard the 
corporate entity.212 Courts will require considerably more than a simple presentation of 
abuses or manipulations on the part of the corporate owner/s. There must be a strong 
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factual basis demonstrating that the abuses or manipulations actually took place before 
the court will extend liability to the shareholders.213 
Determining between proper corporate use and abuse is a difficult task. Many of 
these issues fall within a gray area of legality. While a corporate entity is disregarded for 
one purpose, it may not necessarily be disregarded for other purposes.214 It is clear, 
however, that courts are much more likely to extend liability to either a parent 
corporation or to shareholders of a close corporation, as opposed to shareholders of a 
publicly traded company, for whom courts virtually never pierce the corporate veil. Not 
every factor will be present in each case. The decision to pierce the corporate veil must 
rest on a number of such factors.215 However, the more factors that are present, the more 
probable it is that a court will pierce the corporate veil and hold its shareholders jointly 
and severally liable on those unsatisfied debts.216 
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corporate formalities necessary for the issuance of or subscription to the corporation's stock, such as formal 
approval of the stock issue by the board of directors; (4) an individual shareholder representing to persons 
outside the corporation that he or she is personally liable for the debts or other obligations of the 
corporation; (5) failure to maintain corporate minutes or adequate corporate records; (6) identical equitable 
ownership in two entities; (7) identity of the directors and officers of two entities who are responsible for 
supervision and management (a partnership or sole proprietorship and a corporation owned and managed 
by the same parties); (8) failure to adequately capitalize a corporation for the reasonable risks of the 
corporate undertaking; (9) absence of separately held corporate assets; (10) use of a corporation as a mere 
shell or conduit to operate a single venture or some particular aspect of the business of an individual or 
another corporation; (11) sole ownership of all the stock by one individual or members of a single family; 
(12) use of the same office or business location by the corporation and its individual shareholder(s); (13) 
employment of the same employees or attorney by the corporation and its shareholder(s).”); See Galgay v. 
Gangloff, 677 F.Supp. 295, 299-300 (M.D. Pa. 1987) citing U.S. v. Pisani, 646 F.2d 83, 88 (3d Cir. 1981) 
(“[T]he following are relevant factors in determining the applicability of the alter ego doctrine: 1. Failure to 
observe corporate formalities; 2. Nonpayment of dividends; 3. Insolvency of the debtor corporation; 4. 
Siphoning of funds from the corporation by the dominant shareholders; 5. Nonfunctioning of other officers 
and directors; 6. Absence of corporate records; 7. The corporation is a mere facade for the operation of the 
dominant shareholder or shareholders; 8. Gross undercapitalization.”); See Frazier v. Bryan Memorial 
Hosp. Authority, 1989 OK 73, 775 P.2d 281, 288 (Okla. 1989) (“The question whether an allegedly 
dominant corporation may be held liable for a subservient entity's tort hinges primarily on control. Factors 
which may be considered at trial include whether 1) the parent corporation owns all or most of the 
subsidiary's stock, 2) the corporations have common directors or officers, 3) the parent provides financing 
to its subsidiary, 4) the dominant corporation subscribes to all the other's stock, 5) the subordinate 
corporation is grossly undercapitalized, 6) the parent pays the salaries, expenses or losses of the subsidiary, 
7) almost all of the subsidiary's business is with the parent or the assets of the former were conveyed from 
the latter, 8) the parent refers to its subsidiary as a division or department, 9) the subsidiary's officers or 
directors follow directions from the parent corporation and 10) legal formalities for keeping the entities 
separate and independent are observed.”); For a more extensive list of factors see Associated Vendors, Inc. 
v. Oakland Meat Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 825, 26 Cal. Rptr. 806, 813 (1st Dist. 1962).  
 
41 Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 521 (7th Cir. 1991), (“As for determining 
whether a corporation is so controlled by another to justify disregarding their separate identities, the Illinois 
cases focus on four factors: (1) the failure to maintain adequate corporate records or to comply with 
corporate formalities, (2) the commingling of funds or assets, (3) undercapitalization, and (4) one 
corporation treating the assets of another corporation as its own.”); Goetz v. Goetz, 567 S.W.2d 892, 895 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (“Generally, courts cannot disregard the corporate entity unless the corporation has 
been employed to defraud existing creditors, circumvent a statute, evade an existing obligation, protect 
crimes or perpetrate a monopoly.”); Norris Chem. Co. v. Ingram, 679 P.2d 567, 570 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1984) (“Where corporate formalities are substantially observed, initial financing reasonably adequate, and 
the corporation not formed to evade an existing obligation or a statute or to cheat or to defraud, even a 
controlling shareholder enjoys limited liability.”) citing H. Henn, Law of Corporations, § 146 at 253-254.  
 
42 H. Henn, Law of Corporations, § 146 at 253-254 (Westlaw Publishers, 1970); Also see Henn and 
Alexander, infra note 159, at 353 “[C]ourts have conditioned recognition of corporateness on compliance 
with two requirements: (a) Business must be conducted on a corporate and not a personal basis; (b) The 
enterprise must be established on an adequate financial basis.”).  
 
43 James D. Cox and Thomas Lee Hazen, Cox & Hazen on Corporations, at 275 (2d Ed. Aspen). 
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44 Presser, supra note 4, at Chapter 1 §1:1, page 1-7 citing U.S. v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 
F. 247, 255 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905). 
 
45 See Robert Clark, Corporate Law, 37-38 (Little, Brown 1986); See Robert Clark, The Duties of the 
Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 505 (1977) citing as authority Zaist v. Olsen, 154 
Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552, 558 (1967) (“The instrumentality rule requires, in any case but an express agency, 
proof of three elements: control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not 
only of finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the 
corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own; that 
such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of 
a statutory or other positive legal duty, or a dishonest or unjust act in contravention of plaintiff's legal 
rights; and that the aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss 
complained of.”).  
 
46 Clark, supra note 45, Corporate Law at 37. 
 
47 Id.
48 Presser, supra note 4, at Chapter 1 §1:2, page 1-9. Presser also points to an interesting article on the 
competing theoretical approaches to limited liability which consistently evolve and disagree about the 
piercing doctrine thus preventing any attempt by scholars to crystallize the piercing doctrine. See Ribstein, 
Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 Md. L. Rev. 80 (1991); See M. Wormster, Disregard 
of the Corporate Fiction and Allied Corporation Problems 37-38 (New York: Baker, Voorhis and Co. 
1927) (“In my judgment [it] is not only impossible but preposterous [that the rules as to when the corporate 
veil could be pierced ought to be codified]. Human life and relations in regard to corporate development are 
far too complex to permit of any such formulation. The law is a growth and must not be shackled. 
Corporate law, in particular, develops so rapidly that such a formation would be stale even before the date 
of its publication.”).  
 
49 Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 354, 116 S. Ct. 862 (1996) (“Piercing the veil is not itself an 
independent…cause of action, but rather is a means of imposing liability on an underlying cause of 
action.”); Casini v. Graustein, 307 B.R. 800, 811 (Bankr. N.J. 2004) (“Before invoking the doctrine [of 
piercing the corporate veil], a plaintiff must first establish an independent basis to hold the corporation 
liable.”). 
 
50 Casini v. Graustein, supra note 49, at 811 (“Having established corporate liability for a tort or breach of 
contract, if the corporate defendant has insufficient assets to satisfy a prospective judgment, the plaintiff 
may then seek to pierce the veil.”).  
 
51 Id.
52 Thompson, supra note 7, at 1048.  
 
53 Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 177 W. Va. 343, 346 (W.Va. 1986) citing David H. Barber, Piercing the 
Corporate Veil, 17 Williamette L. Rev. 371, 373 (1981) (“Given the purpose of promoting commerce by 
providing limited liability for shareholders in state corporation laws, courts have been reluctant to pierce 
the corporate veil, even when the express purpose of incorporation was to limit the liability of the 
incorporators.”). 
 
54 Thompson, supra note 7, at 1068.  
 
55 See David C. Cummings, Disregarding the Corporate Entity: Contract Claims, 28 Ohio St. L.J. 441, 450 
(1967).  
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56 Thompson, supra note 7, at 1068-69.  
 
57 Id. at 1069.  
 
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Presser, supra note 4, at Chapter 1 §1:1, page 1-8 (Piercing the corporate veil “is a doctrine applied by 
courts in an extremely discretionary manner, in accordance with the individual consciences of the 
judges.”); See Thompson, supra note 7.  
 
61 Presser, supra note 4, at Chapter 3 §3:5, page 3-56, points to this case which takes a very rigorous 
attitude toward piercing the corporate veil:  Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1521-
1523 (3d Cir. 1994), judgment aff’d, 514 U.S. 938, 115 S. Ct. 1920 (“[T]he corporate veil is pierced only 
when the corporation was an article and a sham to execute illegitimate purposes and [an] abuse of the 
corporate fiction and immunity that it carries.” “Not every disregard of corporate formalities or failure to 
maintain corporate records justifies piercing the corporate veil…[piercing the corporate veil] is available 
only if it is shown that a corporation’s affairs and personnel were manipulated to such an extent that it 
became nothing more than a sham used to disguise the alter ego’s use of its assets for his own benefit in 
fraud of its creditors.”); Industrias Magromer Cueros Y Pieles S.A. v. La. Bayou Furs, 293 F.3d 912, 920 
(5th Cir. 2002) (“Under Louisiana law, only exceptional circumstances warrant the radical remedy of 
piercing the corporate veil.”); Gurry v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 406 Mass. 615, 550 N.E.2d 127, 133 
(Mass. 1990) (“Massachusetts law is clear that the corporate veil should only rarely be pierced to prevent 
“gross inequity…”). 
 
62 See Henn, supra note 42; Roberts' Fish Farm v. Spencer, 153 So.2d 718, 721 (Fla.1963) (“Florida 
jurisprudence indicates a reluctance to "pierce the corporate veil" unless disregard of the corporate entity is 
necessary to prevent injustice.”); McDarren v. Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc., 1995 WL 214482 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“It is well settled that the New York courts are reluctant to pierce the corporate veil…”); 
U.S. v. Funds Held in the Name or for the Benefit of Wetterer, 210 F.3d 96, 109 (2d Cir. 2000) (“under New 
York law, courts must be extremely reluctant to pierce the corporate veil…”); DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc.,
supra note 22, at 683 (“This power to pierce the corporate veil…is to be exercised ‘reluctantly’ and 
‘cautiously’ and the burden of establishing a basis for the disregard of the corporate fiction rests on the 
party asserting such claim.”).  
 
63 See Presser, supra note 4, at Chapter 1 §1:1, page 1-7 citing Ballantine, Parent and Subsidiary 
Corporations, 14 Cal. L. Rev., at 15 (1925) (“[T]he jurisprudence of veil-piercing is a ‘legal quagmire’.”).  
 
64 DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., supra note 22, at 687 (“The conclusion to disregard the corporate entity may 
not…rest on a single factor…but must involve a number of such factors.”); See generally, Thompson, supra 
note 7; Clark v. B.H. Holland Co., 852 F. Supp. 1268, 1277 (E.D.N.C. 1994) ("The conclusion to disregard 
the corporate entity may not, however, rest on a single factor, whether under-capitalization, disregard of 
corporation's formalities, or whatnot, but must involve a number of such factors; in addition, it must present 
an element of injustice or fundamental unfairness.") citing DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., 540 F.2d at 684. 
 
65 DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., supra note 22, at 687 (“The conclusion to disregard the corporate entity may 
not…rest on a single factor…but must involve a number of such factors…[I]n addition, [there must be] 
present an element of injustice or fundamental unfairness.”); Clark v. B.H. Holland Co., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 
1268, 1276 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (“It is not the presence or absence of any particular factor that is 
determinative. Rather, it is a combination of factors, which, taken together with an element of injustice or 
abuse of corporate privilege, suggests that the corporate entity attacked had ‘no separate mind, will or 
existence of its own’ and was therefore the ‘mere instrumentality or tool’ of the dominant [shareholder].”). 
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66 Id. supra note 7, at 1065-69; See DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., supra note 22, at 687 (“undercapitalization, 
coupled with disregard of corporate formalities…”); Brunswick Corp. v. Waxman, 459 F. Supp. 1222 
(E.D.N.Y. 1978), affirmed, 599 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1979) (“[A] failure to observe corporate formalities 
coupled with inadequate capitalization has frequently been cited as a basis for disregarding the corporate 
entity…”).  
 
67 Clark, supra note 45, Corporate Law at 88; However, see Thompson, supra note 7, at 1067 
(“[U]ndercapitalization is not among the factors most frequently cited by the courts in piercing the veil, nor 
is it among the factors associated with the greatest likelihood of piercing. The relative infrequency with 
which courts cite undercapitalization in tort-related piercing cases suggests it is an issue that appeals to 
commentators for reasons other than its predictive significance.”).  
 
68 Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 177 W. Va. 343, 351 (W.Va. 1986) (“The obligation to provide adequate 
capital begins with incorporation and is a continuing obligation thereafter during the corporation's 
operations. With respect to determining the adequacy of the corporation's capital, in light of the nature and 
magnitude of the corporate undertaking, there are several tests and factors which can be utilized to analyze 
the financial data of the corporation. The capitalization of the corporation in question could be compared 
with the average industry-wide ratios obtained from published sources. These average ratios could be 
buttressed by expert testimony from certified public accountants, securities analysts, investment counselors 
or other qualified financial analysts. Grossly inadequate capitalization for the purpose of piercing the 
corporate veil would generally be reflected by a substantial deficiency of capital compared with that level 
of capitalization deemed adequate in the case by the financial analyst experts.”) citing DeWitt Truck 
Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 686 (4th Cir. 1976). Also citing Barber, Piercing 
the Corporate Veil, 17 Willamette L. Rev. 371, 392-94 (1981) (“Grossly inadequate capitalization” for the 
purpose of piercing the corporate veil would generally be reflected by a substantial deficiency of capital 
compared with that level of capitalization deemed adequate in the case by the financial analyst experts).  
 
69 U.S. v. Golden Acres, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 1097, 1104 (D. Del. 1988) judgment aff’d, 879 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 
1989) (“[T]he obligation to provide sufficient capitalization is an ongoing one, which begins at the time of 
incorporation and continues throughout the corporation’s existence…”); Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., supra 
note 57, at 351;  J. L. Brock Builders, Inc. v. Dahlbeck, 223 Neb. 493, 499 (Neb. 1986) (“Inadequate 
capitalization means capitalization very small in relation to the nature of the business of the corporation and 
the risks the business necessarily entails. Inadequate capitalization is measured at the time of formation. A 
corporation that is adequately capitalized when formed but has suffered losses is not undercapitalized. 
Undercapitalization presents a question of fact that turns on the nature of the business of the particular 
corporation. The general rule is that inadequate capitalization is a factor to be considered in determining 
whether to disregard the corporate entity.”) citing J-R Grain Co. v. FAC, Inc., 627 F.2d 129, 135 (8th Cir. 
1980); DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., supra note 21, at 685-686 (“[T]he obligation to provide adequate capital 
begins with incorporation and is a continuing obligation thereafter…during the corporation’s operations.”) 
citing Gillespie, Dix, Adequate Risk Capital, 52 NW. U. L. Rev. 478, 494 (1958).   
 
70 H. Ballantine, Ballantine on Corporations, 303 (rev. ed. 1946).  
 
71 Id.; A “transitional period of time” meaning at least from incorporation until the corporation becomes 
profitable (or should become profitable if it becomes profitable at all). Robert Clark in Corporate Law,
supra note 42, page 90, suggests that once a corporation is set-up, failure to replenish the capital is not an 
adequate reason to pierce the corporate veil. Clark states “there is no affirmative duty on [the shareholders’] 
part to supply an additional investment to a dying corporation. Such a duty would be in fundamental 
contradiction to the policy of permitting limited liability.” 
 
72 Baatz v. Arrow Bar, 452 N.W.2d 138, 142 (S.D. 1990) (“…questions relating to individual shareholder 
liability resulting from corporate undercapitalization should not be reached until the primary question of 
corporate liability is determined.”).  
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73 Presser, supra note 4, at Chapter 1 §1:9, page 1-51 (““The basic idea behind the “undercapitalization” or 
“inadequate capitalization” theory is that if the shareholder or shareholders deliberately incorporate with 
initial capital they know to be inadequate to meet the expected liabilities of the business they intend to be 
doing, they are engaging in an abuse of the corporate form, and ought to be individually liable when those 
liabilities actually occur.”).  
 
74 Ballantine, supra note 70, at 303.  
 
75 Black’s Law Dictionary 164 (7th ed. 2000) (Capital – “Money or assets invested, or available for 
investment, in a business.”). 
 
76 Pinto & Branson, Understanding Corporate Law, 45 (Bender & Co., Inc. 2004); See Doyle v. Hoyle,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10347, 4 (D.N.H. 1995) (“Inadequate capitalization means capitalization very small 
in relation to the nature of the business of the corporation and the risks the business necessarily entails. In 
regard to that amount of capital that constitutes sufficient capitalization, the following standard 
emphasizing economic viability rather than an inflexible computation of minimal capitalization should be 
used: a corporation is undercapitalized when there is an obvious inadequacy of capital, measured by the 
nature and magnitude of the corporate undertaking.”).  
 
77 Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 45. Pinto & Branson point out that all owner contributions, including 
equity and loans, are considered capital.  
 
78 If a corporation procures adequate insurance, this will make a finding of undercapitalization less likely, 
even if the insurer later goes bankrupt. See Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 45, who cite to Radaszweski 
v. Telecom Corp., 981 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1992) (“This distinction [between capital and insurance coverage] 
escapes us. The whole purpose of asking whether a subsidiary [or other corporation] is "properly 
capitalized," is precisely to determine its "financial responsibility." If the subsidiary is financially 
responsible, whether by means of insurance or otherwise, the policy behind the [case law] is met. Insurance 
meets this policy just as well, perhaps even better, than a healthy balance sheet.”).  
 
79 Id.
80 Professor Arthur R. Pinto is a professor of law at Brooklyn Law School in New York; Professor Douglas 
M. Branson is a professor of business law at the University of Pittsburgh in Pennsylvania.  
 
81 Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 46.  
 
82 Id.; See Ballantine, supra note 70.  
 
83 Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 46.  
 
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Minton v. Cavaney, 364 P.2d 473, 475 (Cal. 1961) (Justice Taynor lists three separate grounds for 
invoking the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil in the opinion: “The equitable owners of a 
corporation…are personally liable when they treat the assets of the corporation as their own and add or 
withdraw capital from the corporation at will; when they hold themselves out as being personally liable for 
the debts of the corporation; or when they provide inadequate capitalization and actively participate in the 
conduct of corporate affairs.”); Slottow v. American Casualty Co., 1 F.3d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Under 
California law, inadequate capitalization of a subsidiary may alone be a basis for holding the parent 
corporation liable for acts of the subsidiary.”).  
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88 Id.
89 Id. at 475. See note 74.  
 
90 Id. at 475 (“[T]he evidence is undisputed that there was no attempt to provide adequate capitalization. 
Seminole never had any substantial assets. It leased the pool that it operated, and the lease was forfeited for 
failure to pay the rent. Its capital was ‘trifling compared with the business to be done and the risks of 
loss…’.”).  
 
91 Clark, infra note 92.  
 
92 See Robert Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 505, n.10 (1977) 
(“It should be noted that, at least in recent years, inadequate capitalization per se does not trigger veil 
piercing in California, and the courts apply the principles [set forth in the leading ‘inadequate 
capitalization’ cases] in a fairly strict fashion.”) citing Walker v. Signal Companies, Inc. 84 Cal. App. 3d
982 (4th Dist. 1978), and U.S. v. Healthwin-Midtown Convalescent Hospital and Rehabilitation Center, 
Inc., 511 F. Supp. 416 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff’d, 685 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1982) as the authoritative ‘inadequate 
capitalization’ cases in California; See Hackney & Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital,
43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 885 (1982) (“[N]o decision has been found which squarely and unambiguously 
announces a per se rule” that grossly inadequate capitalization alone will support piercing the corporate 
veil.); However, the Slottow case, supra note 74, seems to contradict these Californian cases, but has 
received negative analysis from other courts; J. L. Brock Builders, Inc. v. Dahlbeck, 223 Neb. 493, 499 
(Neb. 1986) (“Inadequate capitalization, by itself, is insufficient to prove fraud.”). 
 
93 Id.; J-R Grain Co. v. FAC, Inc., 627 F.2d 129, 135 (8th Cir. 1980) (“Inadequate capitalization is a factor 
for consideration in determining whether to disregard the corporate entity.”); Pinto & Branson, supra note 
76, at 47, point out that Judge Easterbrook stated in Secon Service System, Inc. v. St. Joseph Bank & Trust 
Co., 855 F.2d 406, 416 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[W]e are unaware of any decision relying on undercapitalization 
alone as grounds for disregarding the corporate entity in a contract case.”). 
 
94 See Consumer's Co-op v. Olsen, 142 Wis. 2d 465, 483 (Wis. 1988) (“In order for the corporate veil to be 
pierced, in addition to undercapitalization, additional evidence of failure to follow corporate formalities or 
other evidence of pervasive control must be shown.”); Hickman v. Hyzer, 261 Ga. 38, 39-40 (Ga. 1991) 
(“The Supreme Court of Georgia holds that for undercapitalization of a corporation to justify piercing the 
corporate veil, it must be coupled with evidence of an intent at the time of the capitalization to improperly 
avoid future debts of the corporation.”); Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 520 (7th 
Cir. 1991) (“A corporate entity will be disregarded and the veil of limited liability pierced when two 
requirements are met: First, there must be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate 
personalities of the corporation and the individual or other corporation no longer exist; and second, 
circumstances must be such that adherence to the fiction of separate corporate existence would sanction a 
fraud or promote injustice.”) citing Van Dorn Co. v. Future Chemical and Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 
1985). 
 
95 See Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 343, 348 (1947). 
 
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414  (N.Y. 1966). 
 
99 Id. at 422.  
 
100 Id. at 419.  
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101 See Walkovszky v. Carlton, 23 N.Y.2d 714 (N.Y. 1968) holding that Walkovszky’s amended complaint 
was sufficient and his case was able to be continued.  
 
102 Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451 (2d Cir. 1995).  
 
103 Id. at 1459 (“Courts have generally declined to find alter ego liability based on a parent corporation's use 
of a cash management system.”) citing In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 675 F. 
Supp. 22, 34 (D. Mass. 1987) (Without “considerably more,” “a centralized cash management system . . . 
where the accounting records always reflect the indebtedness of one entity to another, is not the equivalent 
of intermingling funds” and is insufficient to justify disregarding the corporate form.); United States v. 
Bliss, 108 F.R.D. 127, 132 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (cash management system indicative of the “usual parent-
subsidiary relationship”); Japan Petrol., 456 F. Supp. at 846 (finding that segregation of subsidiary's 
accounts within parent's cash management system was “a function of administrative convenience and 
economy, rather than a manifestation of control”); See Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 48.  
104 See supra note 80.  
 
105 Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 48.  
 
106 Id.
107 See supra note 103.  
 
108 Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1991) (“When nothing is invested in the 
corporation, the corporation provides no limited liability protection to its owner. Nothing in, nothing out, 
no protection.”).   
 
109 Id.; See Nilsson, Robbins, Dalgarn, Berliner, Carson & Wurst v. Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538 (9th 
Cir. 1988); See Hackney & Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 837 
(1982).  
 
110 Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 
111 Id. at 213.  
 
112 Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 48. 
 
113 Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F.2d 497 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 583 (1941).  
 
114 Id. at 502; See Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 48-49 for their analysis of Arnold v. Phillips.
115 Id. at 502-503; Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 49.  
 
116 Clark, supra note 45, Corporate Law at 90.  
 
117 See DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., supra note 22, at 687 (“It is thus clear that corporate formalities, even 
rudimentary formalities, were not observed by the defendant…”); Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey 
Fund-Raising Management, Inc., 519 F.2d 634, 638 (8th Cir. 1975) (“[C]orporate formalities [were] not 
followed…”).  
 
118 Id.
119 All these examples can be found in the case of DeWitt Truck Brothers, Inc., supra note 22: (“[T]he 
corporation never had a stockholders’ meeting.” at 687); (“At the times involved here [the defendant] 
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owned approximately 90 percent of the corporation’s outstanding stock, according to his own testimony, 
though this was not verified by any stock records. [The defendant] was obscure on who the other 
stockholders were and how much stock these other stockholders owned, giving at different times 
conflicting statements as to who owned stock and how much.” at 687); (“[I]ssued [stock] for a 
consideration of one dollar [per share].” at 687); (“[The defendant] was receiving from $15,000 to $25,000 
each year from a corporation, which, during most of the time, was showing no profit and apparently had no 
working capital.” at 687); (There was no record that any director or officer had “received any fee or 
reimbursement of expenses or salary of any kind from the corporation…” at 687); (“[N]o corporate records 
of a real directors’ meeting in all the years of the corporation’s existence…” at 687); See Mackey v. Burke,
751 F.2d 322 (10th Cir. 1984); See Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp., 528 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. 1975); See Doe v. 
Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001).  
 
120 Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 43.  
 
121 Id.
122 House of Koscot Development Corp. v. American Line Cosmetics, Inc., 468 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1972).  
 
123 Id. at 66.  
 
124 Id. at 67.  
 
125 DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976).  
 
126 See Presser, supra note 4, at Chapter 3 §3:6, p. 3-70.  
 
127 DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., supra note 125, at 687.  
 
128 Presser, supra note 4, at 3-79; DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., supra note 125, at 687.  
 
129 See Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 44, where they discuss their belief that the lack of corporate 
formalities alone may not be enough to warrant piercing the veil; Harris v. Wagshal, 343 A.2d 283, 287 
(D.C. 1975) (“While disregard of corporate formalities is a circumstance to be considered, it is generally 
held to be insufficient in itself, without some other facts, to support a piercing of the corporate veil.”); 
Clark v. B.H. Holland Co., 852 F. Supp. 1268, 1277 (E.D.N.C. 1994) ("The conclusion to disregard the 
corporate entity may not, however, rest on a single factor, whether under-capitalization, disregard of 
corporation's formalities, or whatnot, but must involve a number of such factors; in addition, it must present 
an element of injustice or fundamental unfairness.") citing DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., 540 F.2d at 684; 
Clark is followed in Bradson Mercantile, Inc. v. Vanderbilt Indust. Contracting Corp., 833 F. Supp. 37 
(W.D.N.C. 1995); Cox & Hazen, infra note 163, at 283 (“Disregard of corporate formalities…does not 
appear sufficient by itself to pierce the corporate veil,” citing Solomon v. Western Hills Dev. Co., 312 
N.W.2d 428, 434 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).  
 
130 See Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 43-44, citing MBCA Close Corporation Supplement § 25. 
 
131 Id.
132 Tannahill v. Aunspach, 538 N.W.2d 871 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).  
133 Scott Graphics, Inc. v. Mahaney, 549 P.2d 623 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976).  
 
134 Id. at 627 (“There was disregard of corporate formality in the operation of this corporation and there was 
considerable ignorance on the part of the directors and officers as to its operation. These things in and of 
themselves are not enough to warrant disregarding the corporate entity. However, should mismanagement 
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occur for fraudulent purposes or result in injustice, then the corporate entity will be disregarded. We find no 
evidence of fraud or injustice here.”). 
 
135 Clark, supra note 45, at 85.  
 
136 This example is exemplified in the DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. case, supra note 125.  
 
137 See In re Haugen Constr. Services, Inc., 104 B.R. 1013 (D.N.D. 1989) for an example of this.  
 
138 Clark, supra note 45, at 85; also see DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., supra note 64.  
 
139 Clark, supra note 45, at 85;  Solomon v. Betras Plastics, Inc., 550 So. 2d 1182, 1185 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) 
(“A failure to follow corporate formalities (i.e., properly issuing stock or keeping records) is not, by itself, a 
sufficient ground upon which to base individual shareholder liability. This is because a loss is normally not 
caused by the failure to follow corporate formalities.”) citing Riley v. Fatt, 47 So.2d 769 (Fla. 1950); Eagle 
v. Benefield-Chappell, Inc., 476 So.2d 716, 719 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Cox & Hazen, infra note 160, at 283; 
Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, 789 P.2d 24 (Utah 1990).  
 
140 See DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., supra note 124, for an example of this. In DeWitt, there were no 
corporate records of directors’ or stockholders’ meetings held by Fruit Co. However, this caused no direct 
injury to DeWitt. Yet, it was still considered a factor in determining whether corporate formalities had been 
followed to determine whether to pierce the corporate veil.  
 
141 See Scott v. McKay, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 7221 (Tex. App. 2003) (“[F]ailure to comply with corporate 
formalities is no longer a factor in considering whether alter ego exists.”) citing Hinkle v. Adams, 74 
S.W.3d 189, 194 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.). 
 
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 See Robert Hamilton, The Law of Corporations in a Nutshell at 90 (5th ed.; St. Paul: West 2000).  
 
145 Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 
146 See supra note 80.  
 
147 Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 42.  
 
148 Id.
149 See Flynn v. Greg Anthony Constr. Co., 95 Fed. Appx. 726 (6th Cir. 2003) for examples of intertwined 
activities.  
 
150 Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 43.  
 
151 American Trading and Production Corp. v. Fischback & Moore, 311 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Ill. 1970).  
 
152 Id. at 416.  
 
153 Id. at 414 (“At the time of the fire, all four of the Subsidiary's directors were also directors of the Parent, 
and four of the Subsidiary's eight officers were also officers of the Parent. However, the corporations 
maintain separate offices and conduct separate directors' meetings. The financial books and records of the 
Subsidiary are maintained by its employees in Chicago, and contain only entries related to its own 
operations. The Subsidiary has its own bank accounts and negotiates its own loans from third parties; 
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however, these loans are reviewed and guaranteed by the Parent. On occasion, the Subsidiary has borrowed 
money from the Parent; these loans are evidenced by notes and call for interest at the prime rate.”). 
 
154 Kramer v. Keys, 643 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1981); See Cox & Hazen, infra note 160, at 284 for a brief 
discussion of the Kramer case. 
 
155 Id. at 385-386.  
 
156 Id. at 385.  
 
157 Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 42.  
 
158 Id; This must especially be done in “one-man corporations” where the corporation is owned by one 
person who is the sole shareholder, director, etc. Lack of corporate formalities and intermixture of affairs 
have proven to be unique hazards for one-man corporations because they are inherently characteristic of 
one-man corporations. For example, there is no need to have one-man shareholders’ and directors’ 
meetings, the sole shareholder will more than likely invest his personal funds to keep the corporation 
capitalized, the sole shareholder will also often intermingle his funds with that of the corporation’s funds, 
and one-man corporations are almost always controlled exclusively by the sole shareholder. These are 
seemingly necessities in running a one-man corporation but will still be considered factors in determining 
whether to pierce the corporate veil. That is why it is of key importance that the sole shareholder keep 
scrupulous records in his dealings with his corporation.  
 
159 See Harry G. Henn and John R. Alexander, Law of Corporations, at 352-354 (West 1983) for a 
discussion of the various problems which may arise in one-person corporations.  
 
160 See Patricia A. Carteaux, Corporations – Shareholder Liability – Louisiana Adopts a Balancing Test for 
Piercing the Corporate Veil, 58 Tul. L. Rev. 1089 (March 1984); Cataldo, Limited Liability with One-Man 
Companies and Subsidiary Corporations, 18 Law & Contemp. Prob. 473, 497-98 (1953). 
 
161 Carteaux, supra note 160, at 1100; However, see Henn and Alexander, supra note 159, at 353 (“It is a 
well-settled rule that ownership of all or almost all the shares by one individual or a few individuals does 
not afford sufficient grounds for disregarding corporateness.”).  
 
162 DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., supra note 125, at 681, “[E]qually as well settled is the principle that plain 
fraud is not a necessary prerequisite for piercing the corporate veil, is the rule that the mere fact that all or 
almost all of the corporate stock is owned by one individual or a few individuals, will not afford sufficient 
grounds for disregarding corporateness…[However,] when substantial ownership of all the stock of a 
corporation in a single individual is combined with other factors clearly supporting disregard of the 
corporate fiction on grounds of fundamental equity and fairness, courts have experienced ‘little difficulty’ 
and have shown no hesitancy in applying what is described as the ‘alter ego’ or ‘instrumentality’ theory in 
order to cast aside the corporate shield and to fasten liability on the individual stockholder.”  
 
163 James D. Cox and Thomas Lee Hazen, Cox & Hazen on Corporations, at 282 (2d Ed. Aspen). 
 
164 Id.
165 James D. Cox is a professor of law at Duke University. Thomas Lee Hazen is a professor of law at the 
University of North Carolina.  
 
166 Cox & Hazen, supra note 163, at 282.  
 
167 United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247, 255 (E.D. Wis. 1905) (“It is not 
unusual for a court in this country to disregard the corporate entity, or in synonymous terms "pierce the 
corporate veil," when corporate form has been used to "defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect 
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fraud, or defend crime.”); C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight Ltd. P'Ship, 306 F.3d 126, 135 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(“Virginia courts require a party seeking to pierce a corporate veil to prove that (i) the corporation is ‘the 
alter ego, alias, stooge, or dummy’ of the individual, and (ii) the individual used the corporation to ‘evade a 
personal obligation, to perpetrate fraud or a crime, to commit an injustice, or to gain an unfair 
advantage.’”). 
 
168 See Industrias Magromer Cueros Y Pieles S.A. v. La. Bayou Furs, 293 F.3d 912, 920 (5th Cir. 2002) 
citing LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1953 (West 1987). 
 
169 Gulfstream, Inc. v. Palm Yacht Sales, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 7208 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Under Florida law, 
wrongdoing must be shown before a corporate veil may be pierced. Florida law considers wrongdoing to be 
using the corporation as a device or sham to accomplish some ulterior purpose such as fraud or some illegal 
purpose.”). 
 
170 U.S. v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998) (“The corporate veil may be pierced and the 
shareholder held liable for the corporation's conduct when…the corporate form would otherwise be 
misused to accomplish certain wrongful purposes, most notably fraud, on the shareholders’ behalf.”); Sea-
Land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 520 (7th Cir. 1991) (“A corporate entity will be 
disregarded and the veil of limited liability pierced when…the fiction of separate corporate existence would 
sanction a fraud or promote injustice.”); See Pinto & Branson, supra note 74, at 49 (“If a court finds that a 
corporation had no reason to exist other than evasion of a contract or a statute, the court may disregard the 
corporation.”); Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 186 F.3d 1356, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“The 
concept of "piercing the corporate veil" is equitable in nature and courts will pierce the corporate veil to 
achieve justice, equity, to remedy or avoid fraud or wrongdoing, or to impose a just liability.”). 
 
171 See Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 49-50 (“Courts may disregard the corporation if the sole purpose 
of forming the corporation was to perpetrate the fraud.”).  
 
172 The first example can be found in the case of Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source, 993 F.2d 1309 
(7th Cir. 1993). The second example can be found in the case of Sundaco, Inc. v. State, 463 S.W.2d 528 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1970).  
 
173 See Undercapitalization section and note 67. 
 
174 See supra note 67; Robert Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1036 (1991) (An empirical study analyzing 1600 cases involving piercing the corporate veil). 
 
175 See supra note 169.  
 
176 Linn & Lane Timber Co. v. United States, 236 U.S. 574 (1915).  
 
177 Id. at 577.  
 
178 Id. at 577-78.  
 
179 Trs. of the Nat'l Elevator Indus. Pension…v. Lutyk, 332 F.3d 188, 194 (3rd Cir. 2003) (“In determining 
whether to pierce the corporate veil, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has 
considered the following factors…siphoning of funds from the debtor corporation by the dominant 
stockholder…”); Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 843 F.2d 145, 150 (3rd Cir. 1988) (“Some of the 
factors that must be considered to determine if the corporate veil should be pierced include…siphoning of 
funds of the corporation by the dominant stockholder…”). 
 
180 Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source, 993 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 
181 Id. at 1312.  
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182 Id. at 1311.  
 
183 Cox & Hazen, supra note 163, at 276 (“If the separate corporate capacity is used dishonestly, such as to 
evade obligations or statutory restrictions, the courts will intervene to prevent the abuse.”) citing Attorney 
General v. M.C.K., Inc., 736 N.E.2d 373, 380 (Mass. 2000) (“[D]octrine of corporate disregard may be used 
to carry out legislative intent and thereby avoid evasion of statutes.”).  
 
184 Sundaco, Inc. v. State, 463 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). 
 
185 Id. at 532 (“It is held that courts will look through the form to the substance of the relations between 
corporations and will disregard the fiction of corporate identity if it is used to circumvent the statute or as a 
mere tool or business conduit”) citing Wilson Finance Co. v. State, 342 S.W. 2d 117. 
 
186 See Nebraska Engineering Co. v. Gerstner, 323 N.W.2d 84 (Neb. 1982); KwickSet Components, Inc., 
411 So. 2d at 136 (“[T]he theory of separate existence can be disregarded, even in the absence of fraud, to 
prevent injustice or inequitable results.”).  
 
187 Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (“The plaintiff need not prove actual fraud, 
but must show that failure to pierce the corporate veil would result in an injustice.”); See Morris v. New 
York State Department of Taxation and Finance, 623 N.E.2d 1157, 1161 (N.Y. 1993) (“While complete 
domination of the corporation is the key to piercing the corporate veil, especially when the owners use the 
corporation as a mere device to further their personal rather than the corporate business, such domination, 
standing alone, is not enough; some showing of a wrongful or unjust act toward plaintiff is required. The 
party seeking to pierce the corporate veil must establish that the owners, through their domination, abused 
the privilege of doing business in the corporate form to perpetrate a wrong or injustice against that party 
such that a court in equity will intervene.”). 
 
188 DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., supra note 125, at 684 (“Contrary to the basic contention of the 
defendant…proof of plain fraud is not a necessary element in a finding to disregard the corporate entity.”; 
“Although there is no doubt that fraud is a proper matter of concern in suits to disregard corporate fictions, 
it is not a prerequisite to such a result, especially when there is gross undercapitalization or complete 
domination of the corporate entity under scrutiny.”; “[T]he theory of liability under the ‘instrumentality’ 
doctrine does not rest upon intent to defraud. It is an equitable doctrine that places the burden of the loss 
upon the party who should be responsible.”).  
 
189 Trs. of the Nat'l Elevator Indus. Pension…v. Lutyk, 332 F.3d 188, 194 (3rd Cir. 2003) (“The court's test 
does not require proof of actual fraud as a prerequisite for piercing the corporate veil. However, where the 
conduct alleged to justify piercing the corporate veil is that the corporation as a whole is a "sham" or 
"facade," a finding akin to fraud is necessary.”). 
 
190 See Rimade Ltd. v. Hubbard Enters., 388 F.3d 138 (5th Cir. 2004), and Kaplan v. First Options, 19 F.3d
1503 (3d Cir. 1994), which suggest that fraud is not a necessary requirement to pierce the corporate veil 
unless there are allegations that the corporation is a sham, façade, or the alter ego of the defendant.  
 
191 See Intl Union, UAW v. Aguirre, 410 F.3d 297, 302-03 (6th Cir. 2005); D. Klein & Son, Inc. v. Good 
Decision, Inc., 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 583 (2d Cir. 2005).  
 
192 Cox & Hazen, supra note 163, at 276 citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 310 (1939) and 66, Inc. v. 
Crestwood Commons Redevelopment Corp., 998 S.W.2d 32, 41 (Mo. 1999) (en banc) (“[A]ctual fraud is 
not necessary; other conduct may justify veil piercing.”); Also see Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1461 
(2d Cir. 1995); However, Cox & Hazen point out at 300 that Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. American Arbitration 
Association, 64 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir. 1995) suggests that domination and control can substitute for a 
showing of unfairness.  
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193 There are three principal variants within the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil: (1) the 
“instrumentality” doctrine, (2) the “alter ego” doctrine, and (3) the “identity” doctrine. These variants state 
somewhat different rules which control when the corporate veil may be pierced. However, upon close 
consideration, none of the variants present a characteristic that distinguishes itself from the other. They are, 
in fact, practically identical to each other, and courts rarely differentiate among the three. I have, therefore, 
labeled this section simply “The Instrumentality Doctrine” to avoid any confusion which may arise from 
trying to differentiate between the three variants. For a more substantial discussion of this see Cox & 
Hazen, supra note 163, at 277-79, and Phillip I. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups: Tort, Contract, 
and Other Common Law Problems in the Substantive Law of Parent and Subsidiary Corporation 111 
(1987).  
 
194 Baatz v. Arrow Bar, 452 N.W.2d 138, 141 (S.D. 1990) (“When an individual treats a corporation "as an 
instrumentality through which he [is] conducting his personal business," a court may disregard the 
corporate entity.”); Wallace v. Tulsa Yellow Cab Taxi & Baggage Co., 61 P.2d 645, 647-48 (Okla. 1936) 
(“Where one corporation is a mere instrumentality or adjunct of a dominant corporation, the court 
conceives it as its duty to look beyond the form to the substance of the transactions involved; the fiction of 
a separate legal entity must be disregarded and the two corporations held to constitute but a single entity.”); 
Frazier v. Bryan Memorial Hosp. Authority, 775 P.2d 281, 288 (Okla. 1989) (“If one corporation is but an 
instrumentality or agent of another, corporate distinctions must be disregarded and the two separate entities 
must be treated as one.”).  
 
195 Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 50; Zaist v. Olson, 227 A.2d 552, 573 (Conn. 1967) (“Courts will 
disregard the fiction of separate legal entity when a corporation is a mere instrumentality or agent of 
another corporation or individual owning all or most of its stock. Under such circumstances the general 
rule, which recognizes the individuality of corporate entities and the independent character of each in 
respect to their corporate transactions, and the obligations incurred by each in the course of such 
transactions, will be disregarded, where, as here, the interests of justice and righteous dealing so demand. 
The circumstance that control is exercised merely through dominating stock ownership, of course, is not 
enough. There must be such domination of finances, policies and practices that the controlled corporation 
has, so to speak, no separate mind, will or existence of its own and is but a business conduit for its 
principal.”). 
 
196 Zaist v. Olson, supra note 193, (“The instrumentality doctrine requires proof of three elements: (1) 
complete domination and control, not only of finances but also of policy and business practices with respect 
to the transaction which caused the damages that at the time of the transaction the corporation had no will 
or existence of its own; (2) the control must have been used to commit fraud, perpetrate a violation of 
statute or legal duty, or a dishonest or unjust act; and (3) the control and breach of duty must have 
proximately caused the injury and unjust loss of the plaintiff.”); See Krivo Industrial Supply Co. v. Nat’l 
Distillers and Chemical Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1103 (5th Cir. 1973).  
 
197 Cox & Hazen, supra note 163, at 302. 
 
198 Id. at 302-03 citing Certain-Teed Prod. Corp. v. Wallinger, 89 F.2d 427, 434, 435 (4th Cir. 1937), cert 
denied, 302 U.S. 707 (1937).  
 
199 Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 50 citing 1 Fletcher’s Encyclopedia of Corporations 205. This is also 
expressed in Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 247 A.D. 144, 157 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff’d, 6
N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 1936) and see Zaist v. Olsen, see supra note 193. 
 
200 See Montgomery Health Care Facility, Inc. v. Ballard, 565 So.2d 221 (Ala. 1990), Texas Indus. v. Lucas,
634 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982), and Larrimore v. Hospital Corp., 514 So.2d 840 (Ala. 1987) for 
examples of this.  
 
201 Zaist v. Olson, 227 A.2d 552 (Conn. 1967). 
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202 Id. at 553. 
 
203 Id. at 574-75. 
 
204 OTR Associates v. IBC Services, Inc., 801 A.2d 407 (N.J. App. 2002).  
 
205 See OTR Associates at 409, 411; also see Pinto & Branson, supra note 75, at 51 for a brief discussion of 
the OTR Associates case. 
 
206 OTR Associates at 410. 
 
207 Id. at 409. 
 
208 See Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 51. The main factors discussed earlier being: undercapitalization, 
lack of corporate formalities, intermixture of affairs, and fraud / misrepresentation.  
 
209 Quoting Zaist v. Olson, supra note 201, at 553.  
 
210 Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 51.  
 
211 Id.
212 Cox & Hazen, supra note 163, at 277.  
 
213 Id. citing Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 
214 Id. at 277. 
 
215 See 1 William M. Fletcher Cyclopedia of Corporations § 41.30 at 664 (1983). 
 
216 Cox & Hazen, supra note 163, at 281.  
